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Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
There is increasing agreement among economists on two broad principles of 
monetary policy. The first principle is that monetary policy should aim to stabi- 
lize some nominal quantity. Monetarists have sought to make monetary policy 
stabilize the growth of the nominal money stock. In some periods of history, 
policy has been committed to pegging the nominal price of gold. Some econo- 
mists have proposed stabilizing a bundle of commodity prices or even the con- 
sumer price index (CPI). 
The second principle, which was taken for granted up until the past fifty 
years, is the desirability of a credible commitment to a fixed rule for monetary 
policy. It is now apparent that there are substantial gains if  the central bank 
commits in advance to a set policy, rather than leaving itself free to exercise 
unconstrained discretion. Traditionally, policy rules took the form of a commit- 
ted value for the monetary unit in terms of gold or silver. Today, the focus is 
on rules that promise to deliver better performance as measured by stability in 
output and prices. One frequently advocated rule is targeting nominal income. 
Some advocates of such rules advocate the complete suppression of discretion 
in monetary policy-making; others view the rules as more general guides and 
would give policymakers discretion to depart occasionally from targets. 
This paper explores some of the issues raised by rules for monetary policy. 
We  proceed as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the desirable properties of com- 
mitment and the characteristics of a good policy rule. We emphasize, in partic- 
ular, rules aimed at stabilizing nominal income. Section 2.2 considers how a 
government could implement a nominal income rule. We  discuss the role that 
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the consensus forecast of nominal income could play in ensuring that the cen- 
tral bank not deviate from an announced target. Section 2.3 examines the time- 
series properties of nominal income and its consensus forecast in order to eval- 
uate how actual policy has differed from nominal income targeting.  Section 
2.4 presents simulations using a simple model of the economy in order to con- 
sider how economic performance might have differed historically if the Fed 
had been committed to some type of a nominal income target. 
2.1  Rules for Monetary Policy 
policy. 
2.1.1  The Benefits of Rules 
The principal economic argument for policy rules comes from the analysis 
of strategic behavior. It is a general proposition that a player in a game has 
much to gain from the ability to commit in advance (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1991, 74-77).  Absent that ability, a player cannot make a credible threat to 
take a later action that will not be in the player’s interest when the time comes 
to take the action. The most cosmic example is the doomsday bomb, wired in 
advance to destroy the world upon nuclear attack. Similarly, it can be advanta- 
geous to commit not to take an action that would be rational on the spot. For 
example, as Fischer (1980) pointed out, it is desirable that the government be 
able to commit not to impose one-time capital levies. Commitment in advance 
is essential, because an unexpected one-time capital levy is the ideal nondis- 
torting tax once capital is in place. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and others applied 
this principle to monetary policy, pursuing Lucas’s (1  972) hypothesis that sur- 
prising monetary expansions raise output. If other distortions in the economy 
make it desirable to raise output, then the government will, rationally, try to 
create a new surprise each year. But the public will be able to see what the 
government is doing. The result of these attempted monetary surprises, there- 
fore, will  be higher  expected inflation and  higher  actual inflation, but  not 
higher output. By committing in advance not to try to create monetary sur- 
prises, the government can lower expected inflation and achieve better perfor- 
mance. 
The monetary history of the United States and many other countries seems 
to support this view. After the gradual departure from the commitments im- 
plicit in the Bretton Woods system, there was a worldwide episode of inflation 
in the 1970s. It appears that most major governments are now committed to 
reasonably stable prices. Yet the form of the commitment is vague. One of our 
purposes in this paper is to discuss ways that the commitment could be made 
more precise and therefore more credible. Because any reasonable government 
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will abandon a policy rule that is unworkable, there must be a strong practical 
case in favor of any particular form of commitment. 
There is also a political argument for policy rules. If  the central bank is 
under the control of elected politicians, or is closely allied with their interests, 
it may be tempted to make opportunistic policy changes before elections. A 
rule for monetary policy  would  largely suppress these political influences. 
Moreover, to the extent that a monetary rule induces the central bank to offset 
the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, as a nominal income target would, 
a monetary rule can suppress the political business cycle resulting from fiscal 
policy as well. 
2.1.2  Characteristics of a Good Rule for Monetary Policy 
The generic monetary policy rule requires the central bank to keep a desig- 
nated indicator within a prescribed band. A rule is defined by  the choice of 
indicator and the location and width of the band. In evaluating the desirability 
of a particular rule, there are four principal characteristics to consider. 
The first characteristic is eficiency. A good policy should deliver the mini- 
mum amount of price variability for a given level of employment variability. 
To  put it differently, one should restrict attention to those policies that are on 
the frontier in the price variability-employment variability space. In the past, 
economists have  derived optimal policy rules within fully developed macro 
models. By contrast, we would recommend a different approach. A policy rule 
should deliver satisfactory performance across a wide spectrum of macro mod- 
els. On  the one hand, the policy should give reasonable price stability in a 
model of  full monetary neutrality, where monetary policy has no important 
influence over real activity. On the other hand, the policy should yield a reason- 
able compromise between price and employment stability in a model where 
money is not neutral. 
A second characteristic of a good rule is simplicity. A rule that is simple has 
a better chance of adoption in the first place and a better chance of continuing 
to be enforced. Closely related is precision. Under a precise rule, such as 
“Keep the price of gold at $300 per ounce,” there can be no doubt whether the 
central bank is adhering to the rule. A rule such as “Keep employment stable 
in the short run but prevent inflation in the long run” has proven to be hope- 
lessly vague; a central bank can rationalize almost any policy position within 
that rule. 
A fourth characteristic, closely related to simplicity and precision, is uc- 
countubility. A monetary policy is more credible if  the citizens of a country 
can make the agency responsible for monetary policy-typically  the central 
bank-accountable  for achieving the policy. Therefore, a policy rule should 
have the property that there is no doubt whether the central bank is performing 
its role properly. Under the relatively vague definition of the Federal Reserve’s 
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being consistent with achieving price and output stability. When policy turns 
too expansionary, as it probably did in the early 1970s, or too contractionary, 
as it probably did in the early 1980s, there is no immediate breach of the rule 
for which  the  Fed  can be disciplined.  By  contrast,  these  policy  deviations 
would have been unambiguous under the type of policy we consider below. 
Policy rules-even  those  with these four desirable  characteristics-have 
side effects. Keeping one variable under tight control may bring high volatility 
to other variables.  Rules that make an intelligent choice between  price and 
employment stability may require tolerance of large swings in interest rates 
and exchange rates, for example, especially if policy in other major countries 
is volatile. Yet if a policy rule is on the frontier of price and employment stabil- 
ity, such side effects should probably be ignored. 
2.1.3  Rules Based on Nominal Income 
Recent advocates of rules for monetary policy have called for the close peg- 
ging of  a  variety  of nominal  indicators-monetary  aggregates,  commodity 
price indexes, the consumer price index, exchange rates, and the price of gold. 
But it seems fair to say that the consensus today favors nominal income as the 
most suitable object of monetary policy. 
Keeping nominal income on a smooth path is a monetary policy that re- 
ceives support from all branches of modern macroeconomics. In equilibrium 
macroeconomics, with full monetary neutrality, smooth growth of nominal in- 
come implies a path for the price level which is simply the ratio of the nominal 
income target to the equilibrium level of real income. Absent erratic behavior 
of equilibrium output, price stability will be the result of the policy. In views 
of  macroeconomics  admitting  monetary  nonneutrality,  the  nominal  income 
standard amounts to an intermediate position on the hard question of how mon- 
etary policy  should respond  to a shock to the price level. Under a nominal 
income target, real output falls 1 percent for each percentage point by  which 
the price level is too high. By contrast, under a price standard, monetary policy 
would be called upon to deliver unlimited contraction until it eliminated all of 
a price shock. Later, we will illustrate the operation of a nominal income target 
in a simple aggregate model with a Phillips curve. But the desirability of this 
policy comes from its robustness with respect to the characteristics of the econ- 
omy in general and to the sources of monetary nonneutrality in particular. 
Nominal income targeting is one policy in a broader class which Hall (1985) 
dubbed “elastic price targets.” Policies in this class set a fundamental price 
target, but permit deviations from the target to the extent that the unemploy- 
ment rate deviates from its equilibrium level. A more elastic policy permits a 
larger price deviation per point of unemployment deviation. Within a Phillips 
curve economy, an elastic price policy is efficient in the sense we defined ear- 
lier: it puts the economy  on the frontier of best achievable combinations  of 
price and employment variability. 
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economists. Early  contributions to  the contemporary literature are Meade 
(1978), von Weizsacker (1978), and Tobin (1980). Bean (1983) developed a 
formal analysis of the implications of nominal income stabilization in a general 
equilibrium macro model. In his model, there is an “aggregate demand” shock 
whose effects are the same as those of  a random component of  the money 
stock. All reasonable policies offset the part of this shock that is known when 
monetary policy is determined. In addition, the model considers a random shift 
of the production function. With inelastic labor supply, nominal income tar- 
geting minimizes the variance of the deviation of real output from its equilib- 
rium value; otherwise, the minimum variance policy targets a combination of 
real income and the price level with different weights on the two variables. 
West (1986) pointed out that Bean’s conclusions were specific to his particu- 
lar model of monetary nonneutrality. Moreover, Bean used a criterion to evalu- 
ate the performance of policy that gives no weight to stability of the price level. 
Finally, Bean did not consider the source of  disturbances that seem to have 
generated the most acute problems of monetary policy  in the last few de- 
cades-random  disturbances in  the  price  level  itself.  Asako  and  Wagner 
(1992) further investigated issues raised by the Bean and West papers. 
Taylor (1985) concentrated on dynamic aspects of  nominal  income tar- 
geting. He considered three policy rules. The first calls upon the central bank 
to keep the growth of nominal income as close to a constant as possible. Past 
deviations from the policy are not considered in setting the policy for a new 
year. The second policy is an empirical summary of actual postwar policy. The 
third sets the nominal income growth target equal to a prescribed constant plus 
the deviation of real income from equilibrium at the beginning of the year; this 
rule has the central bank raise nominal income growth when the economy is 
in recession. 
According to Taylor’s calculations, the effects of stabilizing the growth rate 
of nominal income are quite unfavorable: because the rule does not concern 
itself with the level of real activity, it lets random shocks build into large move- 
ments of output, with overshooting relative to equilibrium. The postwar actual 
policy rule does better on this account. The third rule seems to deliver the best 
performance, when the volatilities of output and inflation are the criteria. 
Taylor called attention to the importance of stabilizing the level of real out- 
put and not its rate of  change, if  the level is what really matters. The same 
point applies to the price level, though Taylor does not explore this area. If the 
ultimate goal is to stabilize the price level, then the logic developed in Taylor’s 
paper with respect to the level of  output applies equally to the price level. 
Policy should make up for deviations of the level of output from equilibrium 
and the price level from target. The best policy rule will be one that keeps the 
level of nominal income on a target path. 
McCallum (1988) made two important contributions to the recent literature 
on stabilization. First, he stressed the need for robustness in policy rules: given 
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be one that performs reasonably well across a wide variety of models, rather 
than one that is optimal for one model. Second, McCallum focused on a policy 
rule to which the central bank could be held precisely accountable. Rather than 
prescribe a nominal income target, McCallum would prescribe changes in the 
bank’s own portfolio based on the most recent observation of nominal income 
and on various lagged variables. In McCallum’s view, the central bank could be 
held to a much tighter standard for the monetary base than for nominal income. 
Interestingly, none of the theoretical papers on stabilization has tackled the 
questions of  the fundamental motivation  for stabilizing either output or the 
price  level.  Two  questions  seem  central:  Should  policy  try  to  stabilize 
the growth rate or the level of real activity? Should policy try to stabilize the 
inflation rate or the price level? These questions have remained largely outside 
the professional  commentary on stabilization. For real activity, if  there is an 
increasing marginal cost of departures of real output from equilibrium, then a 
simple convexity argument establishes that volatility is socially undesirable. In 
this case, Taylor is right that stabilization efforts should be directed at the level, 
not the rate of growth. Alternatively, if fluctuations are costly in part because 
there are costs associated with adjusting to different levels of economic activ- 
ity, then the volatility of the growth rate may be of independent interest. 
For prices, the issue is even less clear. As Hall (1985) observed, an important 
source of the social cost of unstable prices is in personal financial planning. It 
would appear to be desirable to run the economy so that the probability distri- 
bution of the price level thirty years in the future has a mean close to the current 
level (no chronic inflation) and with only a moderate amount of dispersion. In 
this respect, it would be better to stabilize the price level rather than the rate of 
inflation. By contrast, under inflation stabilization, there will be a random-walk 
element to the price level, representing the accumulation of random influences 
not deliberately canceled by  stabilization policy. The variance  of the condi- 
tional distribution of the future price level will grow in proportion to the time 
horizon.  By  thirty  years  out,  the  dispersion  will  inevitably  be  large,  even 
though the incremental randomness from each year may be small. 
Other costs of price instability point toward the desirability of inflation stabi- 
lization. For example, a traditional argument holds that inflation  is socially 
costly because it enlarges the wedge between the private cost of holding cur- 
rency and the social cost of producing it. By this argument, it would only add 
to the social cost of a burst of inflation for it to be followed by a compensatory 
period of deflation, as a policy to stabilize the price level would mandate. 
A related question is the measure of  the price level that is most suited for 
stabilization. Again, the answer should flow from a theory of the social benefits 
of  price stability. If the benefits  are mainly in the area of personal financial 
planning, the object of  stabilization should be prices relevant for consumers. 
Monetary policy could promise to remove almost all macroeconomic uncer- 
tainty from the CPI, so families could plan without having to consider varia- 
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could apply to a wage index, so plans could be made without macro uncertainty 
about earnings. A compromise between the two would be the gross domestic 
product implicit deflator. In the past few decades, the primary source of differ- 
ences between the CPI and the implicit deflator has been the world oil price. 
Because the United States consumes more oil than it produces, the CPI gives 
more weight to oil than does the implicit deflator. Stabilizing the implicit de- 
flator or the nominal wage means that monetary policy does not have to erase 
all of the effect of changing oil prices on the cost of living. By contrast, under 
CPI stabilization, changes in oil prices would necessitate changes (in the oppo- 
site direction) in the implicit deflator and nominal wages. 
2.1.4  Conclusions on the Form of the Monetary Policy Rule 
We  find a reasonable professional consensus on the proposition that a good, 
if not precisely optimal, rule for monetary policy is to target nominal income. 
The exact form of a nominal income target depends on one’s view of the rela- 
tive importance of stabilizing the level or growth of output, and of  stabilizing 
the price level or inflation rate. The literature suggests a consideration of three 
types of nominal income policies: 
Growth-rate targeting. Keep the growth of  nominal income as close to a 
constant as possible. 
Level targeting. Keep the level of nominal income as close as possible to a 
path that is prescribed, once and for all, at the time the policy is first put 
into effect. 
Hybrid targeting. Keep the growth of nominal income over the coming year 
as close as possible to a constant plus the current percentage gap between 
real income and its equilibrium level. 
Below we  perform some simulations to estimate the economic performance 
that might result from each of these policies. Our next topic, however, is how 
the central bank should implement a nominal income policy rule. 
2.2  Implementation of the Policy Rule 
The feedback from monetary change-purchases  or sales of  securities in 
exchange for reserves-to  nominal income is notoriously slow. Proposals to 
stabilize nominal income through optimal control rules based on estimated 
causal relations between money growth and nominal income growth may lack 
robustness. Control rules must be biased strongly toward inaction in order to 
avoid the possibility of unstable feedback. 
Control is most effective and least likely to result in  instability when the 
variable under control responds quickly to the inputs. Steering a car comes 
naturally to most people because the effects of moving the steering wheel are 
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there are long lags between changing the rudder and the actual movement of 
the ship. And once the ship starts to turn, it continues long after the rudder is 
returned to normal. A novice is likely to oversteer in the first place and then 
make larger and larger unstable corrections. A central bank faces a similar 
problem if it uses its portfolio to keep nominal income on target. 
As Gordon (1985) and Hall (1985) observed, forecasts can help deal with 
the problem of long lags and unstable feedback. The spirit of  such a rule is 
that policy is too expansionary when today’s forecast of nominal income a year 
or two hence is above the target for that time. It is reasonable to expect the 
central bank to make the forecast of a serious independent forecaster exactly 
on target, even though it could never be expected to put actual income on 
target. The feedback loop from current monetary policy to current forecasts of 
nominal income a year or two in the future is quick and powerful. It takes many 
months for monetary policy to affect actual income, but the consensus forecast 
that far in the future is quite responsive to current monetary policy. Within a 
few days of a change in monetary policy, the consensus forecast changes to 
reflect expert opinions about the effects on all macro variables, including nom- 
inal income. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board already is a close follower 
of outside forecasts. Moreover, the Fed has a large and respected forecasting 
group of  its own. Forecasts are already an  important part of  the process of 
executing policy. Just as the experienced pilot of a large ship can predict the 
movements of the ship well into the future, based on observations of tide, wind, 
engine speed, and rudder settings, the Fed already takes advantage of the con- 
tribution that forecasts make to the control process. Were the Fed to be fully 
committed to the nominal income target, it would probably be unnecessary to 
tell it to use forecasts to improve the feedback control process. 
The most important role of forecasts is to enforce the monetary policy rule 
upon the central bank. Because there are random unpredictable determinants 
of  nominal income, the central bank cannot be expected to keep nominal in- 
come itself exactly on target. A band of a few percentage points in either direc- 
tion would have to be part of a statement of a policy rule formulated in terms 
of nominal income itself. In this case, the public could not know whether any 
given deviation from the policy rule was the result of recent random events or 
the result of the central bank having decided to depart from the rule: 
By contrast, there is no need for any band if the policy is stated in terms of 
a forecast for one to two years in the future. If the consensus of  outside fore- 
casters says that nominal income will come in below target, the public and the 
legislature will know that the central bank has failed to adhere to the policy. A 
policy to peg the consensus forecast is on much the same footing as a policy 
to peg the exchange rate; it is subject to immediate and almost indisputable ver- 
ification. 
We  say “almost indisputable” because there is an issue of defining the con- 
sensus. In the United States, there is a published consensus of respected private 79  Nominal Income Targeting 
forecasters (Blue Chip Economic Indicators),  but the definition of the consen- 
sus is potentially open to argument. Compared to the current debates about the 
conduct of monetary policy, however, this issue seems minor. 
The argument for tying  the Fed  to  outside forecasts rests in  part on a 
principal-agent argument. A principal (in this case, the citizens) needs to set 
up incentives for the agent (the Fed) to deliver the result that the principal 
wants. The agent’s own incentives can lead to behavior quite undesirable for 
the principal. Certainly the chronic inflation experienced in much of the post- 
war era supports this style of analysis. Even if there is some reduction in policy 
effectiveness associated with tying monetary policy to outside forecasts, this 
may be a reasonable price to pay to solve the principal-agent problem. 
Once the Fed is committed to pegging the consensus forecast of nominal 
income, we see no need to tell it how to go about achieving the peg. The Fed’s 
bond traders should simply buy or sell securities as needed to keep the forecast 
at the peg. In practice, this would be similar to the way in which many central 
banks today achieve exchange-rate pegs. There is a difference in response time, 
of course. The exchange rate reacts to portfolio changes in a few seconds, 
whereas the consensus forecast reacts to portfolio changes in a few days or a 
week. Just as a supertanker needs a more qualified pilot than a small ship, a 
central bank pegging a nominal income forecast needs a better technician than 
one pegging an exchange rate. But the peg is still just a technical issue. 
2.2.1  The Lead Time 
So far, we have  discussed the idea of targeting nominal income forecasts 
made today for a year or two in the future. How should the lead time be chosen? 
If  the forecast lead time is short, pegging the forecast will come close to 
achieving the nominal income target itself. That is, the error in a forecast for 
nominal income next quarter is smaller on average than the error in a forecast 
for four or eight quarters in the future. Thus a short lead time yields a policy 
with little slippage relative to the target. On the other hand, a short lead time 
means that the target-the  forecast for the near future-is  not very responsive 
to monetary policy. Large swings in interest rates, exchange rates, and related 
variables may be needed to keep the forecast on target. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether closer achievement of the nominal 
income target is desirable. Nominal  income targeting puts a large implicit 
weight on price stability. Using a forecast for nominal income well into the 
future to guide monetary policy is more tolerant of short-term disturbances in 
the price level. It may therefore result in an economy that performs better than 
one that is held to a tight short-term nominal income target. 
2.3  The Time-Series Behavior of Nominal Income and Its Forecasts 
In  this section we  examine the time-series behavior of actual nominal in- 
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of the consensus forecast; we show that the power is substantial, so that the 
forecast makes sense as a target. Second, we comment on what type of nominal 
income rule comes closest to describing the Fed’s actual policies over the past 
two decades. 
2.3.1  The Predictive Power of the Consensus Forecast 
HOW  predictable is growth in nominal income over the next year? In tables 
2.1 and 2.2 we present regressions of  the change in the log of  nominal gross 
national product (GNP), denoted x, over four quarters on variables one might 
use to forecast this variable, including the consensus forecast. The residual 
Table 2.1  The Efficiency of Nominal Income Forecasts, Part I 
Dependent Variable xt4 -  x 
Constant 
Forecast 
x -  x_I 
L3  - 
P -  P-I 
P-, -  P-2 
P-2 -  P-3 
P-3 -  P-4 
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Table 2.2  The Efficiency of Nominal Income Forecasts, Part I1 
Constant  .o  I I  ,0006  ,0067  .044 
(.014)  (.016)  (.014)  (.016) 
Forecast  325  ,845  ,668  ,880 
(.178)  (.177)  (.217)  (.137) 
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Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. These are computed allowing for heteroskedasticity and 
an MA(3) error term. 
from such a regression should follow a moving average process, so we report 
robust standard errors. We  examine the period 1971:2-1992:4,  for which we 
have data on the consensus forecast. We  obtained the consensus forecast from 
Steven McNees of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. These consensus fore- 
casts are the median of the forecasts of several large forecasting firms. 
The regression in the first column of table 2.1 indicates that the consensus 
forecast by itself is a good indicator for the future path of nominal income. The 
R2 of the regression with only the consensus forecast is 0.38. Other forecasting 
variables contribute little beyond the consensus forecast. The other columns of 
table 2.1 try lags of nominal GNP, prices (p),  real GNP (y),  and prices and real 82  Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
GNP together. The regressions in table 2.2  try traditional indicators of mone- 
tary policy: the growth in monetary aggregates and the federal funds rate (r). 
If the consensus forecast were fully rational, it would aggregate all available 
information, so that none of the other variables would help forecast nominal 
GNP growth. The evidence on this point is almost, but not quite, decisive. In 
all these regressions, the coefficient on the forecast is close to the theoretically 
predicted value of one. In most cases, the hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the other lagged variables are zero cannot be rejected at conventional signifi- 
cance levels. The only exception is regression (3) in table 2.2: lagged interest 
rates appear to help predict growth in nominal income. This apparent rejection 
of  forecast rationality may be the result of the small sample bias discussed in 
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986). 
Overall, the results in tables 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that substantial information 
is contained  in  the  consensus  forecast  of  nominal  income. This finding  is 
broadly supportive of the plan of using the consensus as the target for monetary 
policy. That is, the consensus is a reasonable indicator of future values of a key 
nominal quantity. 
2.3.2  The Fed’s Historical Policy 
Although the Fed has never adopted any formal nominal income target, it is 
interesting to see to what extent the actual behavior of nominal income and its 
forecast have corresponded to any form of nominal income targeting. The line 
marked with squares in figure 2.1 shows the data for the four-quarter ahead 
consensus forecast of nominal GNP growth. Data on forecasted  growth are 
useful  to examine because they eliminate noise coming from short-run sur- 
prises. 
The data show no sign of any policy of stabilizing the forecasted level of 
nominal  GNP.  Under  a  level policy, forecasted  growth  in  nominal  income 
would be low when nominal income was above the target path and vice versa. 
The line in figure 2.1  marked with circles shows the deviation of the level of 
nominal GNP from its trend path over the period from 1969 through 1991. For 
the decade from 1971 to 1981, nominal  GNP rose further and further above 
trend,  but  there  was  no systematic  decline  in  forecasted  nominal  growth. 
Toward the end of the period, when nominal income was much closer to trend, 
forecasted nominal GNP growth was actually lower than at almost any earlier 
time. 
Another approach to determining  if  policy  has followed  a level target is 
to look at the serial correlation of nominal income growth itself. Under level 
targeting, the serial correlation would be negative,  as policy  would depress 
growth in later quarters if nominal GNP grew excessively in one quarter. But 
the actual autocorrelations of nominal income growth are somewhat positive. 
There is also little evidence that the Fed has followed a policy of keeping 
nominal GNP growth constant. In contrast to what would occur undergrowth- 
rate  targeting,  forecasted  nominal  income  growth  fluctuated  substantially 83  Nominal Income Targeting 
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Fig. 2.1  Forecasted nominal GNP growth 
through  1980. Starting in 1980, however, the data are roughly consistent with 
the idea that policy  adopted the rule of  gradually slowing nominal income 
growth through 1985, and then holding it at a constant level of about 6 percent 
per year. 
The data show some support for the idea that the Fed pursued a policy simi- 
lar to hybrid targeting. The lower line shows the real GNP gap at the time of 
the  forecast.  The hybrid  policy  would  call  for higher  forecasted  nominal 
growth when the output gap was negative and lower forecasted growth when 
the output gap was positive. There are signs of high forecasted growth at the 
troughs of 1971 and 1975. Yet in late 1982 and early 1983 there is no support 
for the hybrid policy's  strategy of raising forecasted nominal income growth 
when'the economy is far below potential. 
As a general matter, one might interpret figure 2.1 as suggesting that the Fed 
pursued hybrid targeting in the 1970s, and growth-rate targeting in the 1980s. 
Yet, throughout this period, the mean level of nominal income growth was too 
high to prevent chronic inflation. 
2.4  A Historical Counterfactual 
Our goal in this section is to examine how economic performance  might 
have differed historically if the Fed had pursued a policy of targeting nominal 
income. We specify a simple model of the economy, calibrate it to U.S. data, 84  Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
and then use it to examine this historical counterfactual. The model allows for 
monetary nonneutrality because of  short-run price stickiness, and it can be 
described in the familiar terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The 
behavior of  aggregate supply is summarized by  a backward-looking Phillips 
curve. Aggregate demand is summarized by the behavior of  nominal income. 
Expressing all variables in logarithms, we  can write nominal income as the 
sum of the price level and real income: 
(1)  x=p+y. 
We  do not look into the details of aggregate demand, but rather assume that 
the Fed can expand or contract as needed to keep the nominal income forecast 
exactly on target. We are interested in comparing historical performance with 
three policies for the rule governing growth in nominal income. 
The first policy is growth-rate targeting. Under this policy, the Fed tries to 
keep nominal income growth  stable, but it allows base drift. That is, past 
shocks to nominal income, whether reflected in output or prices, do not influ- 
ence future nominal income growth. Therefore, growth in nominal income is 
white noise around a constant mean: 
(2)  Ax = p. + E. 
We  interpret this equation as the aggregate demand schedule, with the policy 
rule treated as an endogenous element of aggregate demand. The disturbance, 
E, represents the influence of  factors that cause policy to miss the nominal 
income growth target. With policy based on pegging the consensus forecast 
exactly, the disturbance is precisely the error in the consensus forecast. 
The second policy is level targeting. Under this policy, no base drift is al- 
lowed. Shocks to nominal income, whether reflected in output or prices, are 
reversed in the following year, as the Fed takes action to return nominal income 
to the target level. Therefore, nominal income obeys 
(3)  x = p.t + E. 
Again, E is the forecast error in the consensus forecast. 
The third rule is hybrid targeting. In contrast to the previous two policies, 
this policy treats output and prices differently. Under hybrid targeting, the Fed 
raises nominal income growth when output falls below the natural rate, but it 
does not adjust nominal income growth when the price level deviates from 
target. We  express this policy as 
(4) 
The last term is the difference between potential and actual real output ob- 
served at the time the forecast is made (four or eight quarters in advance). 
For all three of  these policies we  set the mean level of  nominal income 
growth p. to be 2.5 percent per year. 
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2.4.1  The Model 
We  use a traditional expectations-augmented Phillips curve. In particular, 
inflation depends on past inflation, the deviation of output from its natural rate, 
and supply shocks. That is, 
(5)  Ap = IT  + A (Ap-, -  IT) +  (y  - fl-,  + U, 
where IT  is the mean rate of inflation for the monetary regime, A measures the 
persistence of inflation, and a  governs the short-run trade-off between prices 
and output. To  determine the natural rate of  output, we use smoothed actual 
real GNP.’ 
To calibrate the model, we need to choose the key parameters a  and A. We 
apply the model to quarterly data and use A of 0.9 and a  of 0.05. These parame- 
ter estimates imply that a shock to nominal income falls about three-fourths 
on output and one-fourth on prices at the end of the first year. This estimate is 
broadly  consistent with  studies of  U.S. data,  such  as  Ball,  Mankiw,  and 
Romer (1988). 
Next, we  find the time series of shocks (E and v). The time series for v is 
chosen to make the Phillips curve fit history exactly (the series has mean zero 
as a result of estimating the mean rate of inflation for the monetary regime as 
the average over the period). As an estimate of E, we use the actual forecasting 
errors over four- and eight-quarter horizons, as provided by McNees. 
These estimates of the forecasting errors surely overstate what would have 
occurred under a policy of  nominal income targeting. One element of the ac- 
tual forecasting errors comes from instability in monetary policy itself. For 
example, actual nominal GNP growth for the four quarters ending in the first 
quarter of  1973 was  12.4 percent, whereas the forecast made four quarters 
earlier was  10.1 percent. Much of this error is probably attributable to expan- 
sionary monetary policy in 1972. Similarly, unexpectedly contractionary pol- 
icy was partly responsible for the huge overprediction of nominal GNP in the 
period ending in the first quarter of  1982, when actual nominal income fell 
short of forecast by 6.5 percent. These spontaneous changes in policy would 
not have occurred under a monetary policy rule. To take into account the in- 
crease in forecasting accuracy that would result from such a rule, we also carry 
out simulations with zero forecasting errors. The actual magnitude of the fore- 
casting errors under nominal income targets probably lies somewhere between 
the two cases we calculate. 
1. To  be more specific, potential output is .98 times its own lagged value plus .02 times current 
real GNP, all multiplied by a constant  so that  the average level of  potential  is the same as the 
average of  actual real GNP. 86  Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
2.4.2  Results 
Table 2.3 shows the simulation results. The first line describes the historical 
performance of three key  macroeconomic variables from 1972 to 1991. Be- 
cause of chronic inflation, the price level had a huge standard deviation of 34 
percent. The rate of inflation had a relatively modest standard deviation of 2.5 
percent at annual rates, but with a mean of almost 6 percent per year. The root 
mean squared deviation, which includes both the random deviations from the 
mean and the mean itself, was over 6 percent. The standard deviation of the gap 
between actual output and equilibrium was about 2.5 percent, and the standard 
deviation of the annual rate of growth of output was almost 4 percent. 
The next major block presents the results under the three alternative policies 
discussed above, based on targeting the forecast of nominal income four quar- 
ters ahead. The lower block of table 2.3 has the same format, except that the 
policy execution errors, E, are taken as zero rather than historical actuals (the 
price disturbances are taken as historical actuals, however). Note that, with 
perfect achievement of the target, the level and growth policies are the same. 
Table 2.3 yields several conclusions. First, the volatility of the price level 
would have been much lower under any of these policies than it has been his- 
torically. This result is not surprising, of course; it follows directly from the 
lower mean growth of  nominal income. The differences among the three alter- 
native policies are substantial. Level targeting is the policy that would have 
yielded the most stable price level. The growth and hybrid policies both intro- 
duce an  integrated (random-walk) element into the price level. Over a long 
enough period, the standard deviation of  the price level would become large 
Table 2.3  Performance under Alternative Four-Quarter Ahead Targets 
output 
Inflation  Growth 
Price  (annual  output  (annual 
Level  rate)  Gap  rate) 
Actual 
Standard deviation  34.09  2.51  2.49  3.97 
Mean  5.74 
Root mean squared deviation  6.27 
Standard Deviations 
Simulated, actual forecast errors 
Growth  4.43  3.26  5.15  18.60 
Level  1.92  2.14  3.20  6.64 
Hybrid  2.34  1.74  2.26  6.28 
Growth and level  1.82  1.89  I .72  1.91 
Simulated, perfect achievement of  target 
Hybrid  1.86  1.62  1.12  2.22 87  Nominal Income Targeting 
without limit. It is only good luck that causes the growth and hybrid policies 
to deliver reasonably low volatility of  the price level. Only the level policy 
guarantees low volatility of the price level over long periods.* 
Second, these policies would have yielded a more stable inflation rate than 
has been experienced historically. The magnitude of this result is significant: 
any of  the nominal income targets would have reduced the average deviation 
of the inflation rate from zero by  at least half. (Remember that much of  the 
penalty associated with actual policy arises from the chronic inflation it pro- 
duced.) The growth-rate target is less successful in stabilizing inflation than 
are the two other policies. 
Third, the volatility of real income around its equilibrium level depends cru- 
cially on which nominal income target one considers. Growth-rate targeting 
scores badly by this standard, with about double the actual historical volatility, 
and level targeting is also above the actual. Hybrid targeting would have deliv- 
ered a slightly lower volatility of real output. 
The lower block of table 2.3 shows what a perfect nominal income target 
would achieve. The volatility in all four measures that comes from price shocks 
alone is around 2 percent, substantially below the volatility when forecast er- 
rors are included. Forecast errors are a major source of  volatility for policies 
that peg forecasted future levels. The magnitude of the improvement in eco- 
nomic performance that would result from one of these policies depends cru- 
cially on how much forecasting would improve. 
Table  2.3 shows that  actual policy has been  ineficient. A hybrid policy 
would have delivered better output stability and better price stability, even if 
the forecast errors with the policy in operation had been as large as those that 
had actually occurred. And the improvement in both dimensions would be even 
greater in the likely case that the forecast errors were smaller in the presence 
of a stable policy. Alternatively, a level policy could have delivered more stable 
prices with somewhat more output volatility, in the conservative case of histori- 
cal forecast errors, and considerably lower output volatility with smaller fore- 
cast errors. 
Although our explorations in this paper do not go outside the temtory of 
policies based on nominal income, table 2.3 contains a strong hint (confirmed 
by calculations not presented here) that a policy that combined features of the 
hybrid and level policies would dominate all others. The hybrid policy gives 
better output performance because of its response to the level of output relative 
to potential. But it suffers from paying no attention to the price level. A policy 
that pegs the consensus forecast of  a weighted average of the price level and 
real output, with most of the weight on output, can produce the low output 
2. If  there is a random-walk element in real output (a property that cannot be refuted by the 
existing data), targeting the level of nominal income introduces a complementary random-walk 
element into the price level. By  contrast, a growth-rate targeting introduces a random-walk compo- 
nent into the price level even if real output is stationary around a deterministic trend. 88  Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
volatility of the hybrid policy without incurring the cost of the integrated com- 
ponent of the price level. 
Figures 2.2 through 2.5 illustrate the findings of table 2.3. Figure 2.2 shows 
the historical deviations of real GNP from potential, for comparison with the 
simulated deviations in the later figures. We  cannot present any meaningful 
version of  price deviations because the price level rose so much during the 
period. 
Figure 2.3 shows our simulations for the four-quarter ahead growth policy. 
There are two reasons visible in the figure for the high volatility of  output. 
First, the policy permits a collapse of output in early 1983. Under growth-rate 
targeting, unlike the other two policies we consider, the Fed would not alter 
future nominal income growth in response to the low growth in nominal and 
real income during the recession in  1981-82.  Second, there is a sawtooth pat- 
tern to the level of output, especially after 1983. A growth-based policy propa- 
gates any such pattern into the future once it gets started. In a quarter when 
nominal GNP is high, a growth policy requires that the target for that quarter 
in  the following year be correspondingly higher. The figure also shows the 
random walk that a growth-based policy introduces into the price level. All 
told, figure 2.3 amply illustrates the defects of the strict policy that considers 
only the rate of growth of nominal income. 
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Output volatility is lower than for the growth policy, but is higher than actual. 
A deep recession occurs in  198  1-82,  based on the conservative view that the 
forecasting errors actually made during that period would have happened any- 
way and were not the result of unexpected instability in monetary policy. The 
price shocks around 1980 are also partly responsible for the depth of this re- 
cession. Under a level target, any short-run accommodation of  price shocks 
must be subsequently reversed in order to return nominal income to its target 
path. 
Figure 2.5  shows the simulation record of  the hybrid policy. Its  single- 
minded attention to keeping real output at potential makes it deliver much less 
output volatility than the other policies. The recession in late 198  1 is about as 
deep as actual, but is reversed much more quickly than actually occurred. On 
the other hand, the drift of the price level is quite evident. 
Table 2.4 provides information about the issue of the lead time for the fore- 
casts used as policy targets. It compares four- and eight-quarter ahead targets 
for the three types of policy. The results in table 2.4 indicate that longer lead 
times may be desirable. For growth-rate targeting, the volatilities of all four 
measures of performance are substantially lower in the eight-quarter case. For 
the level and hybrid policies, price stability is comparable for both lead times, 
and output volatility is lower for the eight-quarter lead time. 
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Table 2.4  Comparison of Four-Quarter  and Eight-Quarter Ahead Targets 
output 
Inflation  Growth 
Price  (annual  output  (annual 
Level  rate)  Gap  rate) 












4.43  3.26  5.15  18.60 
3.21  2.00  2.58  6.33 
1.92  2.14  3.20  6.64 
1.99  2.20  2.72  4.53 
2.34  1  .I4  2.26  6.28 
2.26  1.58  1.90  3.56 
2.5  Conclusion 
Although nominal income targeting is not a panacea, it is a reasonably good 
rule for the conduct of monetary policy. Simulations of a simple macro model 
suggest that, compared to historical policy, the primary benefit of nominal in- 
come targeting is reduced volatility in the price level and the inflation rate. 
Under conservative assumptions, real economic activity would be about as vol- 
atile as it has been over the past forty years. If the elimination of spontaneous 
shifts in monetary policy improves forecasts markedly, real activity could be 
much less volatile. 
We  have discussed various ways in which a central bank might formulate a 
nominal income target. We have emphasized three in particular, which we call 
growth-rate targeting, level targeting, and hybrid targeting. Our calculations 
indicate that none of  these policies clearly dominates all the others, although 
growth-rate targeting seems to yield the least desirable outcomes. Which tar- 
geting scheme a central bank should adopt depends on the relative costs of 
volatility in  price levels, inflation rates, real income levels, and real income 
growth rates. These are topics on which more research is needed. 
Our discussion has stayed within the domain of  nominal income targets, 
guided by the principle of simplicity. But our results suggest that, if the mone- 
tary authorities will consider a slightly more complicated policy, one that looks 
primarily at the level of real activity and secondarily at the level of  prices, 
they  can achieve a considerably more appealing combination of  output and 
price stability. 92  Robert E. Hall and N. Gregory Mankiw 
We  have avoided discussion of the place of  monetary policy rules in the 
world economy. In effect, we give a prescription for the activities of the central 
bank of a nation or monetary union which does not look beyond its own geo- 
graphical boundaries. We  have not considered the possible merits of making 
the rule of one monetary authority depend on outcomes beyond its borders. 
There is no question that each major central bank influences other economic 
units. But there is no consensus on the way in which monetary policies should 
be coordinated. Just as important, any attempt to impose coordination by pol- 
icy formula would plainly violate the principle of simplicity. 
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Comment  Kenneth D. West 
This is a thoughtful and sensible paper. It makes an important, and policy rele- 
vant,  contribution to  our understanding of  how  nominal income targeting 
might affect the U.S.  economy. But its conclusion in section 2.5 that “nominal 
income targeting is . . . a reasonably good rule for the conduct of  monetary 
policy” is, in my view, premature. 
Let me begin by  reviewing what Hall and Mankiw have done. They have a 
two-equation model. Let p,  be the price level, y,  output, y;” the natural rate of 
output, x, =  p,  + y,  nominal income. One equation is a Phillips curve, 
Ap, -  T = X(Ap,-, -  T)  + CY(Y, -  yc3 + v,. 
The second equation is a nominal income rule: 
level rule: x, = pt  + (x, -  E,-4x,) 
= pr  + E,, 
E, = MA(3) error in consensus forecast; 
growth rule: x, -  x,-~  = p + E,; 
hybrid rule: x, -  x,-~  = p + E, + (y,-,-f-,). 
Hall and Mankiw also experiment with eight- instead of four-quarter rules. 
Given time series for f,  v,,  and E, (computed from the actual data, and as- 
sumed not to change from simulation to simulation), the Phillips curve and the 
nominal income rule are two equations in the two unknowns p,  and y,. In each 
simulation, the constant n  in the Phillips curve is adjusted so that the average 
value of y, -  y;” is zero. 
It seems to me that the hypothetical nominal income policies do not fare 
particularly well relative to actual policy. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that when 
actual forecast errors are used, the growth and level policies invariably yield 
higher standard deviations for the output gap and output growth rates than the 
actual policy did. While the hybrid policy generally does better than the actual 
on these measures of output volatility, it exploits information that would not 
be available if the Fed were trying to follow such a rule, in that it uses the final, 
revised, and rebenchmarked figures for y,  and yc”. Whether use of data actually 
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available would make much difference I do not know; the fact that it might 
make a difference suggests caution. 
All the hypothetical policies tend to do better on volatility of  inflation and 
remarkably better on price-level volatility. For the latter, it is important to note 
that this is true essentially by assumption. In all the simulations, the mean rate 
of  nominal income growth is fixed at 2.5  percent, the mean rate of  output 
growth to that actually observed in the sample. This fixes the mean rate of 
inflation; one can see from figures 2.3 to 2.5 that this implied rate is such that 
there is essentially zero (in fact, slightly negative) inflation over the period. 
Since prices have a marked trend in the actual data, and essentially no trend in 
the simulations, the standard deviation is much larger in the actual than in the 
simulated data. 
Of  course, a basic advantage of a nominal income rule is that it may yield 
stable prices; as the authors note, there are well-known reasons why discretion 
tends to lead to inflation. But this is not necessarily an argument for a nominal 
income rule rather than a price or inflation or money-growth rule, or, for that 
matter, an old-fashioned textbook rule that aims to minimize a weighted sum 
of inflation and/or price and/or output volatilities. Indeed, the class of nominal 
income rules considered seems to me to be inefficient in the sense defined by 
Hall and Mankiw in section 2.1. Suppose for concreteness that one cares about 
the variability of  inflation and of  output growth, and considers the nominal 
income growth rule. This rule minimizes the variance of the sum of inflation 
and output growth, a variance that depends in part on the covariance between 
inflation and output growth. In conventional models, one can get lower vari- 
ability of both inflation and output growth by ignoring the covariance term. 
It is possible that rules that yield substantial efficiency gains relative to nom- 
inal income rules will be so complicated that holding the Fed accountable to 
the theoretically preferable rules will be difficult in practice. But an analysis 
of the trade-off between efficiency and accountability remains to be done. To 
take just one example, why not target not the consensus forecast of  nominal 
income, but a weighted sum of the consensus forecasts of real output and the 
price level, the weight reflecting the relative cost of  output and price vari- 
ability? 
This is the sort of question I would like to see answered before I conclude 
that nominal income targeting is a reasonably good rule. 